Naval War College Review
Volume 72
Number 2 Spring 2019

Article 4

2019

Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime LawEnforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the
Gray Zone and Beyond
Andrew S. Erickson
Joshua Hickey
Henry Holst

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Erickson, Andrew S.; Hickey, Joshua; and Holst, Henry (2019) "Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement
Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond," Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Erickson et al.: Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces

SURGING SECOND SEA FORCE
China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities,
and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond
Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst

C

hina’s armed forces are divided into three major organizations, each of which
has a maritime subcomponent. The gray-hulled People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) claims a growing portion of the PLA’s personnel and resources;
the People’s Armed Police (PAP) leads, and increasingly reflects the paramilitary
character of, China’s white-hulled maritime law-enforcement (MLE) forces, including the China Coast Guard (CCG); and the militia contains a growing proportion of sea-based units, the blue-hulled, PLA-controlled People’s Armed Forces
Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each of China’s three sea services is the world’s largest in terms of ship numbers. Unlike America’s military-focused shipbuilding
industry, China’s massive commercial shipbuilding industry subsidizes overhead
costs for construction of all three sea forces’ vessels. That explains in part how
China has been able to build and modernize all three services so expeditiously,
none more rapidly than its second sea force, centered on the consolidating CCG.
Using a platform-based approach that spans ongoing organizational changes,
complexity, and overlap, this article assesses these vessels, their order of battle,
and their capabilities, as well as likely future trends and implications.1
Over the past decade-plus, China has undertaken a massive MLE modernization program that has increased greatly its capability to operate MLE vessels
in remote areas. A key contributor to near-seas maritime operations to further
disputed sovereignty claims in the “gray zone” between peace and war, these
CCG-centered MLE forces afford Beijing increasing influence over the regional
maritime situation without the direct use of PLAN warships, demonstrating
power while reducing the risk of escalation and allowing the PLAN to focus on
other, more “naval” missions farther afield.2
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This build-out has yielded Beijing a formidable “second navy.”3 Today China
boasts not only the world’s largest navy but also the world’s largest maritime
law-enforcement fleet—by a sizable margin. As of 2017, China’s 17,000-plus
CCG personnel crewed 225 ships of over five hundred tons capable of operating
offshore, and at least another 1,050 vessels confined to closer waters, for a total
of over 1,275—more hulls than the coast guards of all its regional neighbors
combined.4 At more than ten thousand tons full load each, its two Zhaotou-class
patrol ships are the world’s largest MLE ships.
China is applying lessons learned from the U.S. and Japanese coast guards as
well as indigenous experience, including the incorporation of new ship features
such as helicopters, interceptor boats, deck guns, and high-capacity water cannon. Most recently constructed CCG ships now have high-output water cannon
mounted high on their superstructures. The 2014 Haiyang Shiyou (HYSY) 981 oil
rig standoff demonstrated their ability to inflict damage by breaking pilothouse
windows, damaging bridge-mounted equipment, forcing water down exhaust
funnels, and breaking bones of crewmembers on Vietnamese vessels. Many new
CCG ships have quick-launch boat ramps astern, allowing for rapid deployment
of interceptor boats.
China’s MLE buildup is slowing, but far from over; in 2020, China’s coast guard
is expected to have 260 ships capable of operating offshore.5 Many are capable
of operating anywhere in the world.6 Numbers of small craft are not expected
to change significantly; we estimate that the CCG will continue to own at least
another 1,050 smaller vessels confined to closer waters, for a total of more than
1,300 hulls. From 2005 to 2020, this represents overall a fifteen-year net increase
of four hundred total coast guard ships, among them 202 additional ships capable
TABLE 1
CHINA COAST GUARD FORCE LEVELS (2005–20)
Type (tonnage)

2005

2010

2017

2020

15-Year Net Increase

3

5

55

60

+57

Regional patrol ships (1,000–2,499)

25

30

70

80

+55

Regional patrol combatants (500–999)

30

65

100

120

+90

Subtotal: Ships that can operate offshore

58

100

225

260

+202 (+350%)

Coastal patrol craft (100–499)

350

400

450

450

+100 (approx.)

Inshore patrol boats / minor craft (<100)*

500+

500+

600+

600+

+100 (approx.)

Total: All China Coast Guard

900+

1,000+

1,275+

1,300+

+400 (approx.)

Oceangoing patrol ships (2,500–10,000)

Note:
* There are forty-ton interceptor boats stationed on at least one (probably all) of China’s offshore islands. With forward basing available in the South
China Sea disputed areas, size is less relevant than it was previously.
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of operating offshore, representing 350 percent growth in that category. As table
1 indicates, all types of CCG ships have increased in numbers, with the most
significant force-level increases, proportionately, occurring in oceangoing patrol
ships (those over 2,500 tons).
FOUNDATION
China’s MLE modernization program has proceeded in three major phases, the
latter two of which overlap. Phase 1 (2000–10) focused on modest, dual-role
research and patrol ships. These were relatively small (mostly 1,000–1,750 tons,
with several larger ships) and generally unarmed. Only a few had helicopter facilities. Phase 2 (2010–17) yielded dozens of new purpose-built offshore patrol
ships. Much larger than phase 1 vessels (three thousand to ten thousand tons full
load), these ships featured improved sea keeping and endurance, as well as moreadvanced (military-style) electronic systems. Internet photographs indicate that
all CCG ships built within the last five years have a datalink antenna (such as the
HN-900), similar to those on PLAN vessels and to the U.S. Navy’s Link 11; older
CCG ships now are being retrofitted with such antennae. Most vessels have helicopter decks, some with hangars. Some ships have high-pressure water cannon
and ten-meter-long fast-interceptor boats with twin outboard engines enabling
a thirty-five-knot top speed, well suited for dispatch to land features for local security operations. Most new ships built in phase 2 have 30 to 76 mm guns. Phase
3 (2014–18) backfilled with coastal law-enforcement units, primarily dozens of
modern, capable, fast patrol combatants with guns, oriented toward traditional
law-enforcement functions. Several medium-sized patrol ships were built to provide command and control.
In 2013, China consolidated four of its five major maritime law-enforcement
agencies (the “five dragons”) into a new agency called the CCG. The four dragons
thus consolidated are the former State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and its
subordinate China Marine Surveillance (CMS); the former Maritime Police and
Border Control, previously administered by the Ministry of Public Security; the
former Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE), previously administered by the Ministry of Agriculture; and the former Maritime Anti-smuggling Police, previously
administered by the General Administration of Customs (GAC). Only one major
MLE agency remains independent of the CCG: the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA). Another non-CCG organization, China Rescue and Salvage (CRS),
plays a supporting non-MLE role. The latter two will be discussed briefly just
before the conclusion of the article.
More than twenty naval and commercial shipyards have produced CCG vessels over the past decade. With overhead costs reduced by a strong commercial
shipbuilding industry, construction of coast guard and other MLE vessels is both
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cheap and efficient. Use of commercial, off-the-shelf drivetrains and electronics,
combined with a lack of complex combat systems, facilitates rapid assembly, with
multiple units built simultaneously. According to contract and media details,
typical total construction time (from start to commissioning) is twelve to eighteen months for a large (over one thousand tons) patrol ship (designated WPS)
and nine to twelve months for a smaller (under one thousand tons) patrol craft
(WPC) or patrol combatant (WPG).
By 1999, China had made a national-level decision to start expanding and
modernizing its MLE agencies.7 The majority of the shipbuilding budget was
allocated to the organization
then known as CMS, primarUnlike America’s military-focused shipbuilding industry, China’s massive commercial ship- ily responsible for enforcing
building industry subsidizes overhead costs for Chinese maritime territorial
construction of all three sea forces’ vessels. . . . claims and conducting offshore law enforcement.8 Prior
China has been able to build and modernize
to the turn of the century, the
all three . . . expeditiously, none more rapCMS force consisted primaridly than . . . the consolidating China Coast
ily of a limited number of
Guard.
1970s-built dual-use patrol
and research ships, most of which were relatively small and intended for operations in near-coastal areas. None of these ships was configured specifically for
law-enforcement duties, as no guns, helicopters, fast-interceptor boats, water
cannon, or other MLE equipment was fitted.9
Initially, the CMS ship-modernization program focused on the acquisition of
dual-use ships of several sizes that could perform patrol and surveillance duties,
as well as limited research and survey activities. This initial acquisition program
began in earnest in 2004, with most new ships launched and commissioned
by the end of 2005. CMS received three Shuyou-class “1,000-ton” patrol ships
(1,428 tons full load), three Shuwu-class “1,500-ton” patrol ships (1,740 tons
full load), and the first Shucha I “3,000-ton” patrol ship (4,000 tons full load),
which were distributed relatively evenly among the three CMS branches (North,
East, and South). Typical of earlier dual-use patrol ships (known colloquially as
“WAGORs”), all three classes were fitted with stern A-frames and cranes to
enable them to handle hydrographic and oceanographic research equipment,
although few ever have been seen performing such roles.10 Significantly, the
Shucha I class was fitted with a helicopter landing deck and hangar facilities—
not previously fitted to any CMS ships—giving the first indication that CMS
intended to perform offshore missions requiring helicopter support. However, in
keeping with the missions of SOA and CMS—stated publicly as being primarily
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scientific—none of these new ships was armed with any permanent weapons.11
Central to the CMS ship buildup was the thirty-six-hull program that began in
2010. Supplied to provincial and municipal MLE organizations, these ships displaced six hundred to 1,500 tons.
China’s other maritime law-enforcement agencies, which historically only had
limited offshore roles and capabilities, began to acquire a small number of ships
capable of operating offshore. By 2007, the PAP Maritime Police acquired its first
large patrol ship, the Haixun II class’s solitary vessel, Zhong Guo Hai Jing 1001
(now known as Hai Jing 31101). Historically, the PAP Maritime Police had operated only small, fast, heavily armed patrol craft in support of its primary responsibilities of border defense, antismuggling efforts, and immigration enforcement
(as well as regime security). Hai Jing 31101 was equipped with a 37 mm main gun
and a helicopter deck. It had more than four times the displacement of most PAP
Maritime Police patrol craft, and its restricted initial operations revealed the PAP
Maritime Police’s discomfort with operating larger ships; most PAP Maritime
Police patrol craft crewmen were drawn from land-based defense forces rather
than maritime backgrounds. The PAP thus had difficulty adapting to the twentyfour-hour cycle of activity that is required when a ship goes out for days or weeks
at a time; this was not part of its organizational culture.12 For most of its early
career, Hai Jing 31101 rarely ventured beyond coastal waters. It was seen largely
as a ceremonial “status” platform for the PAP Maritime Police, although in recent
years under the CCG it has played a slightly more active offshore role.
The Bureau of Fisheries oversaw China Fisheries Law Enforcement, which
already operated several dozen aging offshore patrol ships used for resource
protection and fisheries enforcement. FLE began its own modest modernization program in the first few years of the new century. This consisted mostly of
introducing new coastal patrol craft classes, but culminated in the construction
of the then-impressive Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo Yu Zheng 310,
which was launched in 2010.13 As with other MLE agencies’ recent acquisitions,
FLE chose to equip WPS 310 with a helicopter deck and hangar—even though
FLE did not actually own any helicopters. In its initial years, FLE used WPS 310
extensively for offshore patrol duties, and in later years the ship would serve as
a proof of concept for at least one follow-on class that now forms the backbone
of the FLE fleet.
Early in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the fourth major maritime
law-enforcement agency, GAC, had just finished building over thirty new twohundred-ton patrol craft (of the Hailin I and II classes) for coastal countersmuggling operations. It did not have a significant ship-construction program ongoing
after about 2003.
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MSA continued its own construction program, acquiring a variety of ships
to fulfill its specialized missions, ranging across buoy tending, environmental
cleanup, search and rescue, light maritime towing and salvage, and port operations. MSA also acquired several large patrol ships that were able to respond to
offshore maritime disasters and emergencies and interact with major coast guard
organizations from other Pacific countries. MSA was the first of the five dragons
to obtain purpose-built patrol ships large enough for transoceanic operations,
with the two Shubian-class ships attending joint exercises in Hawaii and other
distant locales. Unlike China’s other MLE agencies, MSA consistently has maintained a close working relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Japan Coast
Guard, and other regional MLE organizations.14 Unlike the other dragons, MSA
historically has acquired a large portion of its funding from collection of port
fees from commercial shipping, allowing it some degree of budget autonomy and
insulation from the country’s leadership and national budget issues.15
MOVING FORWARD: CHINA’S NEW COAST GUARD
As previously noted, 2013 saw the integration (at least on paper) of four of these
agencies into a new agency called the China Coast Guard. This reform had been
anticipated for several years by the individual agencies, several of which apparently began aggressive construction programs after 2010, perhaps in an attempt
to assert dominance within the new organization’s command structure.16 There
was little cooperation, with each organization (particularly FLE and CMS) apparently focusing on its own ship designs.
Shortly before CCG integration, the CMS force also acquired several auxiliary
ships that recently had been retired from PLAN service. These transfers likely
were intended to fill gaps in patrol capabilities as China began to pursue maritime
expansion more assertively in the South and East China Seas. The vessels included three former intelligence-collection ships (the icebreaking Yanbing-class
former AGI 723, the Xiang Yang Hong 9–class former AGI 852, and the Haiyangclass former AGI 411), as well as a few other old PLAN auxiliaries, including a
converted cable layer, a minelayer, and three large ocean salvage tugs. The former
PLAN ships were pressed into service immediately (largely without naval guns
and electronics), while the ship-construction program of CMS—a leading component of the soon-to-be CCG—proceeded.17
One hallmark of CCG modernization in recent years has been the clear specialization of ships and craft toward particular missions, an outcome of procurement programs initiated in the era of the five dragons.18 Moreover, China’s massive shipbuilding industry (and, presumably, shipbuilding budget) has allowed
the CCG to focus on a variety of designs oriented toward specific requirements,
rather than building jack-of-all-trades ships that were more flexible but less
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/4
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capable of specific functions. However, all these ships and craft remain highly capable of acting in other roles, particularly those related to promoting sovereignty
in disputed South and East China Sea areas.
A second hallmark of CCG modernization is a preference for evolutionary
design modifications. Since 2010, various initial designs have been followed by
frequent revisions in configurations and capabilities. For instance, China has
made four sequential variations of its “regional thousand-ton” patrol-ship design
since the program started almost a decade ago. The original variant (the Shuyou
class) was essentially a dual-purpose research and patrol ship for CMS. It was
equipped with A-frames and cranes at the fantail to accommodate survey activities. As the design progressed to the Shuke I, II, and III classes, the ships clearly
evolved toward a law-enforcement role, with cranes and A-frames removed; davits for small, fast boats added; and hull and superstructure modifications made
to allow them to handle open-water operations better.
Similar upgrades have been made in other classes. These changes were both a
result of close observation of other modern MLE ships (primarily those operated
by the U.S. Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard) and lessons learned by CMS,
FLE, and other CCG agency ships operating farther offshore for longer periods.
MARITIME CUSTOMS AND ANTISMUGGLING
The segment of the CCG that performs maritime customs enforcement (formerly GAC) has been active in acquisitions in recent years, replacing most of
its 1980s/1990s-built fleet of small patrol craft with three new classes of ships
intended specifically for maritime law-enforcement and customs duties. The new
Zhaogao-class patrol ship, of which three were built, gives the CCG additional capability for exclusive economic zone (EEZ) patrol activities, such as intercepting
smugglers farther offshore. The 1,750-ton ship is 308 feet long and thirty-nine
feet in beam. Unlike most CCG patrol ships, which have maximum speeds of just
over twenty knots, the Zhaogao design has four powerful diesel engines that likely allow it to reach top speeds of nearly thirty knots, with a range of five thousand
nautical miles (nm) at fifteen knots.19 These ships also are equipped with two
quick-launch davits for fast-interceptor boats that can be deployed while under
way. The ships are fitted with a 30 mm automatic main gun and a helicopter deck.
A second specialty class, the Hutao I patrol combatant, is configured for
extended patrols deep into China’s EEZ. Like the Zhaogao, the Hutao I is fitted
with four diesels providing a full-power speed of over thirty knots via four shafts
and propellers, and a range of five thousand nautical miles at fifteen knots. The
625-ton Hutao I measures 223 feet long and 28.5 feet in beam. It has dual quicklaunch stern ramps, allowing it to launch and recover fast-interceptor boats while
under way, and is armed with a single 30 mm gun, two smaller guns, and water
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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TABLE 2
CHINA COAST GUARD MARITIME CUSTOMS: NOTABLE CLASSES
Number in
Country

Class

3

Zhaogao
WPS
Hutao I
WPG

8 (3+ new units)

Length
(feet)

Displacement
(tons)

(Hai Jing) 33103 (Zhejiang),
44104 (Guangdong), 46014
(Hainan)

308

1,750

30

(Hai Jing) 31101, 31103,
33104, 35104, 44105, 44106,
45103 + more

223

625

30

Known Pennant Numbers

Guns
(millimeters)

Hutao
III WPG

2

44109, 44110

223

625

30

Haihei
WPC

2

(Hai Guan) 905 + another

205

450

37

Haifeng
WPC

5

(Hai Guan) 900–904

190

440

14.5

(Hai Jing) 33004, 35007,
37001, 44005, 44008, 44015–
18, 44020, 44021, 45001,
45002, 46003 + more

177

330

14.5

Hulai II
WPC

15 (+ new units)

Hailin I
WPC

25+

(Hai Jing) 44059, 44068,
44069; (Hai Guan) 853–80
(pennant numbers probably
changed)

170

230

23,
14.5

Hailin II
WPC

10+

(Hai Jing) 21091, 31088,
33086, 35089; (Hai Guan)
881–90 (pennant numbers
probably changed)

170

230

23

(Hai Jing) 33028; (Hai Guan)
823–30 (pennant numbers
probably changed)

145

170

14.5

(Hai Guan) 810–20 (pennant
numbers probably changed)

140

100

14.5

Type 611
WPC

~10

Haigao
WPC

10+

Notes:
WPC = coast guard patrol craft; WPG = coast guard patrol gunboat; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
The China Coast Guard overall has several hundred classes of ships; to keep this and subsequent tables manageable, only the most significant classes
are included.

cannon. At least eight Hutao Is are operational already, and additional units continue to be built.
A third class, the Hulai II, is cosmetically similar to the ubiquitous Dutch Damen Stan Patrol 4207, a patrol craft operated by over a dozen navies and coast
guards internationally. However, the Hulai II adds a third engine, once again
giving it a top speed of over thirty knots, for missions inside China’s EEZ, particularly maritime customs interdiction, and a range of 1,200 nm at eighteen knots.
The 330-ton Hulai II is 177 feet long and twenty-four feet in beam, and also is
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/4
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equipped with a fast-launch stern-ramp system, allowing it to deploy its interceptor boat while under way. It has small arms and a smoke grenade launcher, highcapacity water cannon, and reinforced hull rub rails. In recent years, variations
of both the Hutao I and the Hulai II designs have been sold to export customers
(the latter to Pakistan), indicating that these are competitive, effective designs in
a crowded international patrol craft market. Over a dozen Hulai IIs have been
built in the last few years, and as many as thirty total units may be built to replace
the CCG’s older Type 611– and Hailin I/II–class patrol craft built in the 1980s
and ’90s.20
LONG-RANGE FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT
Fisheries enforcement and other resource protection in furtherance of China’s
territorial claims always has been a primary mission of China’s maritime agencies, specifically the former FLE. FLE’s progressive integration into the CCG
likely improved the budgetary situation for the former, which to execute its
mission historically had relied on a jumble of older, less-capable patrol ships, a
hodgepodge of patrol craft, and assorted converted fishing boats. Over the past
decade the CCG’s former Fisheries Enforcement Branch embarked on an active
program to replace and modernize its entire fleet.
Most notable with regard to long-distance fisheries enforcement is the new
Zhaoyu-class large patrol ship, of which a dozen were commissioned from 2014
to 2016. At 360 feet long and forty-six feet in beam, the 3,500-ton Zhaoyus have
a traditional combatant-style hull optimized for long-distance cruising in heavy
seas, as these ships are intended for operations well outside China’s disputed
maritime periphery—in theory, anywhere.21 This class has an estimated top speed
of twenty-five knots, with a range of 7,500 nm at fourteen knots. Design modifications were based on lessons learned from FLE’s former flagship, the one-off
Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo Yu Zheng 310, which recently was transferred to the Sansha City municipality. FLE likely identified some design and
stability flaws in the ship, and subsequently improved the Zhaoyu configuration
by reducing the superstructure by one deck (for roll stability) and adding a sternlaunch boat ramp to deploy interceptor and boarding craft from beneath the
helicopter deck. Additional fittings include a helicopter hangar and a substantial
armament of one single 30 mm gun and four single automatic 12.7 mm guns.22
New to this category is the Zhaochang patrol ship, purpose-built for longdistance fisheries enforcement with a new tumblehome hull design and a 30 mm
gun.23 The 3,500-ton ship is 360 feet long and forty-nine feet in beam. A proof
of concept for the CCG’s first ship with electric-drive propulsion, complete with
diesel generators, the sole Zhaochang built to date yields a top speed of only
twenty knots, but has a long range: ten thousand nautical miles at fifteen knots.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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TABLE 3
CHINA COAST GUARD FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED)
Class

Number in
Country

Zhaochang WPS

1

Known Pennant Numbers

Length
(feet)

Displacement
(tons)

Gun(s)
(millimeters)

(Hai Jing) 2301

360

3,500

30

(Hai Jing) 1301–1304, 2302–
2304, 3301–3305, 46305

360

3,500

30

(Hai Jing) 1102–1104,
3104–3106, 21115, 31115,
33115, 35115, 37115, 46115; (Yu
Zheng) 45005, 45013, 45036

269

1,764

30

30

Zhaoyu WPS

12

Zhaotim WPS

14–15

Dalang I WPS
(ex-PLAN)

1

(Hai Jing) 3411

370

4,500

Zhongeng WPS

10+

(Yu Zheng) 13001, 32501,
33001, 33006, 35001, 37008,
44061, 45001, 46012 + more

180

~1,000

Zhongwen WPS

1

(Yu Zheng) 21103

195

850

unknown

Zhongke WPG

6+

(Yu Zheng) 21101, 21111,
27061, 33018, 33205, 45002 +
possibly more

180

~500

unknown

Zhongem WPG

2

(Yu Zheng) 37361

190

550

14.5

Zhongtao WPC

50+

(Yu Zheng) 12002, 21006,
21009, 21137, 21202, 21401,
32511, 32521, 32528, 32543,
32545, 33012, 33015–19, 33023,
33025, 33129, 33316, 33416,
33417, 37001, 37005, 37015,
37529, 37601, 45012, 46013 +
more

160–70

Zhongsui WPC

6

(Yu Zheng) 35199, 44601–603,
44606, 45003

165

~350

14.5

Duancude WPC

10+

(Yu Zheng) 21402, 31006,
37057, 37206, 37518 + more

130

~200

none

(Yu Zheng) 44025, 44081,
44121, 44168; (Hai Jian) 9040,
9060 (additional units operated
by China MSA and PLA MTS)

110

150

~150

Nanhua Type A
WPC

~10

Zhongbong
WPC

10+

(Yu Zheng) 13203, 13301,
32511, 37078, 37163, 37606,
37607

100–20

Fisheries patrol
trawlers

30+

(Yu Zheng) variety of designs
and numbers

100–20

Red Arrow WPB

50+

4-digit, ending in H

40

300–450

250–600
15

14.5

14.5

23

none

none,
generally
none

Notes:
MSA = Maritime Safety Administration; MTS = Maritime Transport Squadron (Army Logistics); PLA = People’s Liberation Army; PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; WPB = coast guard patrol boat; WPC = coast guard patrol craft; WPG = coast guard patrol gunboat; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
The six classes at the bottom of the table (beginning with the Zhongsui WPC), while relatively small in tonnage, are deployable to Chinese-occupied
features in the South China Sea, and may well be used thus.
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For regional fisheries-enforcement operations—particularly in disputed
fisheries areas adjacent to Vietnam (e.g., the Gulf of Tonkin), Japan, and the
Koreas—the CCG built a large class of smaller patrol ships, the Zhaotim class.
The fourteen or fifteen 269-foot-long, thirty-nine-foot-beam, 1,764-ton ships in
this class are optimized for regional, medium-endurance patrols, with a reported
7,500-mile range at thirteen knots, an ice-strengthened hull (for operations in the
northern Bo Hai [formerly known as the Gulf of Chihli]), a 30 mm gun, two small
fast-interceptor boats, and a moderate towing capability to assist disabled fishing
boats. With their regional, near-shore focus, Zhaotims lack helicopter facilities.
The relatively beamy, low-slung hull design, with bulbous bow, indicates that sea
keeping in heavy weather and efficiency were key design factors, rather than the
high speed and maneuverability prioritized in other CCG ships intended for interdiction duties. (Fishing boats, typically low speed, cannot outrun even patrol
ships whose top speed does not exceed twenty knots, such as the Zhaotim class.)
Provincial-level fisheries law-enforcement agencies also have undertaken a
major modernization program. As late as the 1990s, PRC coastal fisheries enforcement predominantly was performed by converted fishing boats and various older patrol craft. However, in the last decade local forces have built about
a dozen different designs of thirty-five-to-sixty-meter coastal patrol craft and
combatants for more-local, short-endurance enforcement duties. Most notably,
the fifty-meter, 450-ton Zhongtao class has been in constant production since
the early years of this century, with over fifty units built at six shipyards to date.
All units share a common hull and basic superstructure design, but vary significantly in how they are fitted out topside, depending on operational location
and typical weather conditions. For operational areas where assertive fishermen
may use collisions and shouldering as a defense against enforcement (e.g., the
Gulf of Tonkin), Zhongtao units have reinforced ribbing along the hulls. For operational areas with heavier sea conditions (e.g., the East China Sea), Zhongtao
units may have raised bow bulwarks. Some units stationed in the Yellow Sea and
Bo Hai may have ice-strengthened bows. Earlier units used small, davit-launched
interceptor boats, while later units have a stern gate and quick-launch ramp. The
Zhongtao class is yet another example of coast guard designers adapting and
learning operational lessons when building new ships and patrol craft.
OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND
SOVEREIGNTY ENFORCEMENT
While the CCG in its entirety has a general role of performing offshore surveillance and patrol (particularly with its larger patrol ships), as well as border defense and territorial enforcement, historically these roles were played primarily
by two former dragons: CMS and the PAP Maritime Police. CMS was primarily
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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responsible for offshore duties, with much of its force composed of larger ships
capable of longer-endurance operations and dual hatted as oceanographic research ships.
As a component of the well-funded SOA, CMS substantially bolstered its new
shipbuilding programs during and after the consolidation with orders for several
new classes of large ships (most of which eventually were commissioned into the
now-consolidated CCG). New CMS ships clearly were built with a primary role
of open-seas, long-term patrol and surveillance duties, and were less equipped for
law-enforcement interception, fisheries administration, oceanographic research,
or safety of life at sea (SOLAS)
roles than CCG ships built
CCG-centered MLE forces afford Beijing increasing influence over the regional maritime prior to 2012.24
The most notable of the
situation without the direct use of PLAN warships, demonstrating power while reducing the new ships built for the CCG
in recent years were the two
risk of escalation.
massive Zhaotou-class flagships, one each based in the south and the east. The Zhaotous have received an
inordinate amount of media attention owing to their great size: with a length of
165 meters (541 feet), a beam of more than twenty meters (over sixty-five feet),
and a full load of more than ten thousand tons, their displacement is greater than
that of modern naval destroyers. Their estimated speed is twenty-five knots, their
range 15,000 nm.
However, the substantive rationale for construction of these ships is unclear,
as they do not offer any technical advantages vis-à-vis other, smaller, patrol ships
built recently for the CCG.25 There are Internet rumors that the ships were ordered in direct response to Japan’s deployment of its 9,500-ton Shikishima-class
cutters to the Senkakus in 2013, which at the time dwarfed any ships in the CCG
inventory, suggesting that construction of the Zhaotou class represents a point
of pride for China—to have the world’s largest coast guard ships—rather than
an actual capability requirement. While that rationale is speculative at best, the
Zhaotou design nonetheless does provide the CCG with a large platform that can
operate anywhere in the world with maximum endurance, while carrying a helicopter and mounting a 76 mm main gun. It is unlikely that any additional units
of this class will be built, however, owing to the ship’s berthing requirements and
the presumably higher cost of operations without any tangible benefit in capability compared with smaller CCG patrol ships.26
Since consolidation, the CCG’s three most effective new classes of large patrol
ships have been the Shucha II, Shuoshi II, and Zhaolai classes, all of which are
based on earlier classes that were operational before the CCG reform. The Shucha
II, of which ten units are currently operational, is based on the Shucha I design
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/4
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originally built for CMS early in the new century. When built, the Shucha I was
the most modern ship in the CMS inventory, combining long-distance endurance with a substantial ability to perform oceanographic research. The Shucha II
improved on this design and oriented the mission strictly toward patrol activities
by eliminating the survey handling equipment and stern A-frame, replacing them
with a larger helicopter deck and launch facilities for small interceptor boats. The
Shucha II, like its predecessor, is equipped with a hybrid diesel-electric power
plant—providing good cruising efficiency and range—and a drivetrain that uses
steerable electric propulsor pods—giving it excellent maneuverability. Moreover,
Shucha II has positions available for installation of 30 mm main guns in the future, if required.27
Arguably comprising the most capable and versatile class in the CCG, the four
Shuoshi II–class units are based on MSA’s flagship Hai Xun 01, built several years
earlier. With a length of 130 m and beam of 16 m (fifty-two feet) and a 5,800-ton
displacement, it is similar in overall size and design to the U.S. Coast Guard’s
Legend-class National Security Cutter. The Shuoshi II design is configured for
long-distance open-ocean operations in any weather conditions. It is fitted with
high-capacity water cannon and a helicopter landing deck and hangar, and has
design provisions for the future fitting of a 76 mm gun. However, unlike that of
many other large, purpose-built patrol ships the CCG operates, a Shuoshi II’s
aft area is considered a “working stern,” capable of performing light rescue and
salvage operations and moderate towing of ships at sea, giving this class a wellrounded capability that is not limited to law-enforcement operations. While it
remains unclear whether additional hulls will be built, this is one of the world’s
most capable, versatile MLE vessels.28
The Zhaolai-class patrol ship likely was an off-the-shelf design intended to
provide the capability quickly to interact with Japanese and Vietnamese vessels in
the Senkakus and the South China Sea. The Zhaolai is based closely on the CRS
Hai Jiu 111–class salvage and rescue ship, giving it a heavy-duty hull, a powerful
engineering plant, and the ability to operate in even the worst sea and weather
conditions. The 4,800-ton Zhaolai design eliminated the large salvage cranes
present on the CRS variant and added davits for small interceptor boats. Each of
the CCG’s four Zhaolais also is equipped with a helicopter landing deck and has
a mount position forward for a 76 mm gun, should the CCG desire to backfit the
ship with one. Among CCG ships, the Zhaolai is configured best for heavy towing
and shouldering of other ships, and its large, high-mounted water cannon can be
used both for firefighting and for dousing smaller foreign ships during close-in,
nonkinetic dissuasion operations. As the Zhaolai was initially an off-the-shelf
stopgap solution to CCG capability shortfalls and is inferior to more-specialized
designs, it is unlikely that additional units will be built.29
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 23

13

2/25/19 10:40 AM

24

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 4

TABLE 4
CHINA COAST GUARD OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND SOVEREIGNTYENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED)

Class

Number
in
Country

Known Pennant Numbers

Length
(feet)

Displacement
(tons)

Guns
(millimeters)

Zhaotou WPS

2

(Hai Jing) 2901, 3901

541

10,000+

76, 30

Zhaoduan WPS

6

(Hai Jing) 31301–303, 46301–303

450

4,000+

76

9

21111, 33111, 35111, 37111, 44111,
45111, 46111–13

328

2,700

76

Shuoshi II WPS

4

(Hai Jing) 1501, 2501, 2502, 3501

426

5,800

76 (prov.)

Zhaolai WPS

4

(Hai Jing) 1401, 2401, 3401, 3402

325

4,800

76 (prov.)

(Hai Jing) 1305–307, 2305–308,
3306–308

321

4,000

30

Zhaojun WPS

Shucha II WPS

10

Hai Yang WPS
(ex-PLAN)

1

(Hai Jing) 3368

345

3,325

none

Kanjie WPS
(ex-PLAN)

1

(Hai Jing) 2506

425

5,830

removed

Type 053
Jiangwei I WFF
(ex-PLAN)

3

(Hai Jing) 31239 [former PLAN
FF 539], 31240 [former PLAN FF
540], 31241 [former PLAN FF 541]

367

2,000

37

Shusheng WPS

5

(Hai Jian) 1010, 2115, 3015, 7008,
9010

290

1,750

14.5 (prov.)

245–65

1,450

none

Shuke I/II/III
WPS

20

Shuyou WPS

3

(Hai Jing) 1117, 2146, 3171

242

1,000

none

Shuwu WPS

3

(Hai Jing) 1115, 2151, 3184

288

1,750

none

Tuzhong WPS
(ex-PLAN)

3

(Hai Jing) 1310, 2337, 3367

278

3,300

none

Haixun II WPS

1

(Hai Jing) 31101

311

1,900

37, 23

Haijian
WAGOR/WPS

4

(Hai Jian) 1118, 2149, 3172, 3174

230

1,350

none

II: (Hai Jian) 9012
III: (Hai Jian) 1015, 1116, 1117,
2030, 3011, 3012, 4067, 4073, 5030,
7018, 7028, 7038, 8003, 8027

215

600

12.7

Shuzao II/III
WPG

15

I: (Hai Jing) 1127
II: (Hai Jing) 1123, 1126, 2166,
3175
III: (Hai Jing) 2112, 2113, 3111–
13; (Hai Jian) 1002, 1013, 2032,
2168, 4001, 4002, 4072; (Yu Zheng)
46016
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CHINA COAST GUARD OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND SOVEREIGNTYENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED) CONTINUED

Class
Type 618B-II
WPG

Number
in
Country
30+

Known Pennant Numbers
(Hai Jing) 015,* 12001, 13101,
13102, 21101–104, 31102, 32102,
33101, 33102, 35101–103, 37101,
37102, 44101, 44103, 45101, 45102,
46101, 46102, 46105, 46106 +
more

Length
(feet)

Displacement
(tons)

Guns
(millimeters)

201–208

650

25 or 30

Notes:
PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; prov. = provisional (i.e., collar fitted but no gun mounted); WAGOR = oceanographic research ship; WFF = coast
guard frigate; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
* This is a training vessel subordinate to the Maritime Police Academy, but is nonetheless fully combat capable.

Meanwhile, the PAP Maritime Police was primarily a coastal and riverine force
not known for its members’ seamanship skills, as most of its personnel originated in ground-based PAP units.30 The CCG currently is building a significant
number of patrol ships from two new, highly capable classes that apparently were
ordered before CCG consolidation by the then PAP Maritime Police (i.e., the old
coast guard). The larger of these classes, the Zhaoduan (Type 818), is the CCG’s
newest and fastest class under construction. It is based directly on the PLAN’s
Jiangkai II (Type 054)–class guided-missile frigate, using an almost identical
hull and likely the same powerful 2+2 combined diesel and diesel (referred to as
“CODAD”) power plant. This naval design has proved highly reliable in PLAN
antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The overall configuration of the Zhao
duan is similar to the Jiangkai II above the main deck as well, but with an additional superstructure deck added and some other topside changes. The Zhao
duan lacks the powerful combat systems of the Jiangkai II, eliminating the HQ-16
vertical-launch surface-to-air missile system, close-in-weapon systems, and longrange military electronics.31 However, the Zhaoduan does retain the same 76 mm
main gun as the Jiangkai II. Together with two 30 mm guns, this makes it the
CCG’s most heavily armed ship. Its helicopter landing area and hangar accommodate Z-9, AW109, or EC135 helicopters. With the propulsion system from the
Jiangkai II but a reduced displacement of something over four thousand tons, the
Zhaoduan likely can attain a top speed of over thirty knots, making it one of the
world’s fastest large coast guard ships, with a ten-thousand-nautical-mile range
at fifteen knots. These qualities will make the Zhaoduan a go-to workhorse for
the CCG. Six units of this class have been launched to date, and additional units
have been ordered, according to some media sources.32
The CCG also is building the smaller Zhaojun (Type 718)–class cutter, using
what appears to be an original design. Displacing 2,700 tons, the ship is 328 feet
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long and forty-three feet in beam. Its estimated maximum speed is twenty-five
knots, its range 6,500 nm. At least nine of these patrol ships have been launched
to date, with several already operational, and additional units are possible. The
Zhaojun has a helicopter deck and a small interceptor boat–launch facility. Like
the Zhaoduan, it is fitted with a 76 mm main gun forward.33
Capable of operating offshore for regional security missions, Type 618B-II patrol combatants performed with distinction in the 2014 HYSY 981 oil rig standoff. They displace 650 tons,
Today China boasts not only the world’s larg- are up to 208 feet long and
est navy but also the world’s largest maritime thirty feet in beam, and have
law-enforcement fleet—by a sizable margin
a large power plant capable of
. . . —more hulls than the coast guards of all
around thirty knots top speed
its regional neighbors combined.
and a two-thousand-nauticalmile range. They are also very
maneuverable. The CCG’s more than twenty-five hulls of this type each have a
25 mm or 30 mm main gun and high-capacity water cannon. Some units have a
fast-boat launch ramp at the stern.
Aside from these purpose-built border-defense ships and craft, the CCG has
accepted three former PLAN Jiangwei I patrol frigates. Their missiles and most
naval systems have been removed, but each retains twin 37 mm guns and a helicopter hangar. These ships are only two thousand tons in displacement, 367 feet
in length, and 40.7 feet in beam; their strength is a top speed of around thirty
knots and a range of 4,500 nm at eighteen knots.
FACILITIES
In recent years, copious open-source information has indicated that China is
consolidating its myriad MLE facilities into a smaller number of larger bases with
substantial berthing capacity and other shoreside infrastructure. Although the
precise number of CCG maritime facilities in China is difficult to determine, the
service is thought to have over two hundred total facilities at which ships or small
craft are stationed.34 However, fewer than forty of these are regarded as large
bases that can accommodate offshore-capable patrol ships. The rest provide basing for coastal or local patrol craft and patrol boats. Many of these smaller bases
are collocated with or near fishing harbors, and are home to FLE patrol craft that
require limited shoreside infrastructure. Many other facilities host even smaller
inshore patrol boats, and essentially are just a small pier or jetty with a single
support building, if that.35
In recent years, the most substantial CCG bases have been expanded significantly, with much larger piers to accommodate all the new ships and substantial
shoreside capacities, including barracks, athletic facilities, and, in some cases,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/4
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TABLE 5
SELECTED MAJOR CHINA COAST GUARD FACILITIES
Province or Equivalent

Coordinates
(approx. latitude/longitude)

Beihai

Guangxi

21.485, 109.084

Fangchenggang Shiping

Guangxi

21.626, 108.316

Qinzhou

Guangxi

21.736, 108.639

Jinzhou

Liaoning

40.846, 121.103

Fuzhou Guling

Fujian

26.055, 119.353

Fuzhou Tingjiang

Fujian

26.074, 119.513

Xiamen downtown

Fujian

24.467, 118.065

Xiamen China Coast Guard (CCG)
base

Fujian

24.511, 118.065

Dalian Mianhuadao

Shandong

39.006, 121.675

Dalian Wantong

Shandong

39.010, 121.709

Yantai Yangma Dao

Shandong

37.444, 121.582

Yantai Zhifu Bay

Shandong

37.545, 121.392

Tianjin port area

Tianjin

Guangzhou Taihe

Guangdong

23.109, 113.395

Huangpu Changzhou

Guangdong

23.077, 113.432

Huangpu Luntou

Guangdong

23.078, 113.375

Shantou

Guangdong

23.353, 116.688

Zhanjiang Tiaoshun

Guangdong

21.286, 110.409

Qinhuangdao fishing wharf

Hebei

39.921, 119.617

Qinhuangdao coal terminal

Hebei

39.935, 119.668

Shanghai Fuxing Dao

Shanghai

31.288, 121.561

Shanghai Gaoqiao

Shanghai

31.357, 121.614

Shanghai port facility

Shanghai

31.384, 121.549

Nantong

Jiangsu

31.908, 120.910

Haikou port

Hainan

20.031, 110.278

Haikou Haidian River

Hainan

20.025, 110.323

Sanya

Hainan

18.233, 109.492

Wenchang

Hainan

19.560, 110.825

Shandong

36.050, 120.298

Location

Qingdao Tuandao Inlet
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SELECTED MAJOR CHINA COAST GUARD FACILITIES CONTINUED
Province or Equivalent

Coordinates
(approx. latitude/longitude)

Qingdao port area

Shandong

36.082, 120.309

Qingdao Huangdao

Shandong

36.005, 120.272

Zhoushan Waichangzhi

Zhejiang

29.980, 122.082

Ningbo CCG Academy

Zhejiang

29.945, 121.710

Wenzhou Lucheng

Zhejiang

28.025, 120.672

Location

Source: Located via Google Earth.

limited ship-repair facilities. Growing emphasis on ship repair shows both an
understanding of a maturing fleet’s operational needs and a desire to avoid being
subordinated to the PLAN for access to maintenance. As part of these efforts, the
CCG built its first floating dry dock. The dock can be moved to different locations,
including South China Sea “features,” and can accommodate smaller patrol ships.
Although the CCG reform began in 2013, in most cases the service’s facilities
remain somewhat segregated according to organizational mission; that is, bases
that previously hosted FLE ships continue to host ships that perform fisheriesenforcement activities. It is unclear whether duplicative facilities will be eliminated in the future.36
CHINA MARITIME SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
MSA was not included in the 2013 CCG consolidation and remains an independent agency with its own fleet and facilities. MSA is responsible for the control
and securing of China’s maritime ports and commercial maritime traffic, for aids
to navigation (buoys, lighthouses, etc.), for pollution control, and for SOLAS,
among other missions. MSA’s presence largely is limited to China’s territorial
waters, although the agency does have several large patrol ships that occasionally
take long voyages for joint exercises with other nations’ coast guard forces or to
participate in search-and-rescue operations (such as searching for the missing
plane from Malaysia Airlines Flight 370). However, the great majority of the MSA
fleet is composed of hundreds of coastal patrol craft; thousands of inshore patrol
boats; and a variety of specialized vessels used for buoy tending, hydrographic
survey, pollution cleanup, and other utilitarian roles.37
MSA, while considered a law-enforcement agency, generally is not involved
in territorial disputes (such as in the South China Sea or Senkakus), fisheries
enforcement, customs, or other countercriminal activities. MSA maintains a
good working relationship with regional forces, including the U.S. Coast Guard,
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the Japan Coast Guard, and South Korea’s Korea Coast Guard, and often works
jointly with these forces.38
CHINA RESCUE AND SALVAGE
CRS, while not a law-enforcement organization, nonetheless is a governmentrun agency under China’s Ministry of Transportation that has a substantial presence in China’s maritime realm. CRS operates both in an official capacity (in
support of SOLAS) and in a commercial capacity, taking on contract work ranging from towing stranded ships and salvaging sunken ships to transporting and
placing commercial oil rigs.
Profits from this commercial side provide CRS with a substantial independent
budget, much of which CRS spends on constant modernization of its impressively large fleet of rescue, salvage, heavy-transport, semisubmersible, and large
crane ships. The most visible CRS units are the thirty-plus modern rescue and
salvage ships, which spend most of their time loitering in busy maritime traffic
areas and roadsteads off Chinese ports.
CRS has several major bases, some of which are collocated with or near CCG
or MSA facilities, but CRS generally does not operate with or interact heavily
with CCG forces.39 While CRS’s large ships may be present in the vicinity of maritime disputes, they typically are there only to provide rescue in case of damage
to other-agency (or foreign) ships and do not get involved in any enforcement or
deterrence activities.
CRS is highly regarded in the international maritime community owing to
its courageous, professional, and experienced personnel, strong rescue ethic,
modern and highly capable fleet of ships, and lack of involvement in maritime
disputes. CRS ships often are contracted to perform transport and other work
around the globe.40
In building both the world’s largest coast guard and the largest overall MLE
force, China has achieved an impressive increase in its maritime capabilities. It
has leveraged massive capacity for building all sizes of patrol ships, cost relief
from commercial construction profits, and domestic production of most systems
(including engines and electronics) to field a formidable number and variety of
ships specialized for different roles and operating areas. Enhanced CCG capacity
is envisioned to allow the PLAN to focus on naval roles beyond the first island
chain, with a commensurate reduction in PLAN small patrol craft over the past
decade.41 Moreover, new CCG ships capable of long-distance operations in
higher seas—the largest capable of operating globally—could permit extended
deployments beyond maritime East Asia (e.g., to conduct antipiracy patrols or
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perform escort duties along sea lines of communication). CCG modernization
and expansion afford China presence and influence to further its East and South
China Seas sovereignty claims while maintaining both domestic and international law-enforcement capability regionally.
China will continue to modernize its MLE agencies’ respective fleets, with primary emphasis on the consolidated CCG. However, the winding down of the major ship-construction program of 2010–17 portends less class variation and more
focus on future construction
[M]assive infrastructure builds, evolutionary of a few (perhaps three or
ship designs, and extensive use of commercial, four) major classes and severoff-the-shelf components offer China the abil- al minor classes, to streamline
logistics and operations. Emity to surge CCG ship construction rapidly.
phasis on size is giving way to
emphasis on speed and filling capability gaps. The CCG likely will continue to grow
numerically but is unlikely to repeat the rate of growth of the past decade—primarily
because China by now has replaced virtually all its older, less-capable large patrol
ships.
In the coming decade, China likely will prioritize smaller coastal-patrol craft
and patrol combatants to continue replacement of the large fleet of small craft
that were built largely in the 1990s and are nearing the end of their operational
life spans. The CCG undoubtedly will focus on remedying its major remaining
areas of weakness: severe rotary-wing limitations (only about fifty helicoptercapable ships and few helicopters); uneven existing crew training, with seamanship competency depending on former agency; and ships being produced faster
than new crewmembers can be trained.42 To improve situational awareness, the
CCG likely will acquire additional maritime-patrol aircraft, including helicopters
(imported or domestic). It will strive to strengthen planning, communications,
and operational control.
While China will continue to focus on security enforcement of its established
territorial waters and EEZ, the CCG will continue to operate regularly throughout waters within the first island chain to support China’s maritime claims, as well
as to perform enforcement and surveillance operations. Forward-basing CCG
units on augmented features in the Paracels and Spratlys will enhance operational
tempo and facilitate coordination with the PLAN and PAFMM.
These expanding CCG capabilities support a decisive shift in Chinese maritime strategy: from a three-sea-force focus on regional seas to an evolving division of labor in which its first sea force—the PLAN—significantly increases its
overseas missions and focus. While regional operations likely will remain the
focus for China’s second sea force, its MLE forces centered on the CCG, the
larger CCG ships increasingly could deploy out of area into the Pacific and Indian
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/4

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 30

20

2/25/19 10:40 AM

E R I C K S O N , H I C K E Y, & H O L S T
Erickson et al.: Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement
Forces

31

Oceans, both to increase presence and influence and to participate in joint coast
guard exercises with other major countries, including the United States, Japan,
South Korea, Russia, and India.
As before, designs will be adapted to suit new missions. Moreover, massive infrastructure builds, evolutionary ship designs, and extensive use of commercial,
off-the-shelf components offer China the ability to surge CCG ship construction
rapidly, if desired. When it comes to rapidity of fleet expansion and modernization, China’s second sea force already is leading the way.

NOTES

Authors’ note: The information in this article
does not rely heavily on other finished academic papers or analyses, although several of
these are cited for context. Instead, the great
majority of supporting information derives
from the authors’ compilation and original
analysis of a vast body of available opensource, firsthand information, almost all of
which is posted on the Internet. The majority
comes directly from tens of thousands of specific Internet and media sources that cannot
be listed individually. For a full discussion of
the documentation methodology and sources
used herein, see the China Analysis from
Original Sources website at the following url:
www.andrewerickson.com/2019/02/open
-source-research-on-chinas-maritime-law
-enforcement-force-structure-development
-methodology-references/.
1.	This article surveys China’s principal MLE
ships from a platform-centric perspective,
organized by mission set. Broadly categorized, MLE forces include the national-level
China Coast Guard; the portion of China
Marine Surveillance (CMS) and Fisheries
Law Enforcement (FLE) vessels organized at
the subnational level (which still exist and are
active in the “gray zone,” but are not included
in the CCG); Maritime Safety Administration
(MSA) vessels, which exist outside the CCG
even at the national level; and China Rescue
and Salvage (CRS) vessels, which are outside
the CCG even at the national level and generally
play only supporting (not MLE/sovereigntyupholding) roles. The present analysis
spotlights the CCG as the core organizing
entity for the majority of China’s MLE forces
at the national level, whose consolidation
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remains a work in progress, and refers to
them broadly as “China’s coast guard.” The
article also addresses some of the most
important non-CCG ships, including from
provincial-level—but not municipal—MLE
organizations. This ecumenical, organizationally flexible approach, which acknowledges
the complexities and vicissitudes of China’s
evolving empirical reality, has the virtue that
the vessels themselves remain discrete and
readily identifiable amid substantial changes
in leadership, control, and nomenclature.
China’s MLE organizations have been reconfigured tremendously in recent years (and
reforms remain ongoing), and vessels have
shifted both among them (as well as having
been transferred in from the PLAN) and in
their relationship to the gray zone. The past
decade also has witnessed multiple firsts in
terms of China’s MLE assets operating in certain areas. MLE fleet usage, like the general
regional situation, is fluid. Ships from all the
agencies (including FLE, General Administration of Customs [GAC], and MSA) have
been observed participating in, or at least in
the vicinity of, conflicts in the gray zone. For
instance, while GAC vessels are absent from
many gray-zone operations, GAC patrol craft
can be seen in photos of the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation Haiyang Shiyou
(HYSY) 981 oil rig operations. Accordingly,
our coverage includes some MLE ships and
forces (e.g., GAC, MSA, and CRS) that are
not always involved in gray-zone operations,
but conceivably could become involved in the
future, particularly as features the Chinese
have augmented in the South China Sea offer
forward-deployment options. Moreover, not
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all CCG ships are relevant to gray-zone operations. Some are too small to be considered
“oceangoing,” although this is a subjective
term. For instance, many ships performing disputed-area operations and similar
functions displace fewer than five hundred
tons, leaving no identifiable size cutoff in
this regard. Conversely, some ships outside
the CCG are relevant to rights-protection/
gray-zone missions. The CCG reorganization in 2013 incorporated only national-level
assets, not provincial, county, or municipal
MLE vessels. For example, the Zhongtao class
is not actually part of the CCG, but rather is
part of provincial-level fisheries-enforcement
resources. CMS also has provincial-level
cutters. Guangdong and Hainan Provinces
have provincial-, county-, and municipallevel cutters relevant to rights-protection/
gray-zone missions. One vessel dramatically
encapsulates the value of a platform-centric
approach: Having joined FLE in November
2010, Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo
Yu Zheng 310 conducted multiple rightsprotection missions when it was homeported
in Guangzhou, including the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff and its March 2013
jamming of Indonesian Ministry of Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries vessel Hiu Macan 001.
From July 2013 to May 2015 the vessel was
designated CCG 3210 and participated in the
2014 HYSY 981 incident. Redesignated Sansha
City Comprehensive Law Enforcement 1 in
May 2015, the ship now is based in Sansha
City and engages in further sovereignty
missions. Scott Bentley, “Indonesia’s ‘Global
Maritime Nexus’: Looming Challenges at Sea
for Jokowi’s Administration,” The Strategist,
September 24, 2014, www.aspistrategist
.org.au/; Ryan D. Martinson, “The Lives of
a Chinese Gunboat,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 142/6/1,360 (June 2016), pp.
34–39. For the leading organization-centric
analysis of the CCG, see Ryan D. Martinson,
Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in
Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy, China
Maritime Study 15 (Newport, RI: Naval War
College Press, February 2018), available at
digital-commons.usnwc.edu/. The authors
thank Ryan Martinson and Barney Moreland
for helpful inputs.
2.	For analysis of Chinese MLE participation in
gray-zone operations, see Andrew S. Erickson
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and Ryan D. Martinson, China’s Maritime
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Institute Press, 2019).
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(April 2015), available at www.usni.org/.
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Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review 70,
no. 2 (Spring 2017), p. 84. Japan’s coast guard
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forty-five, and the U.S. Coast Guard has fifty.
Unless otherwise specified, all such numbers
represent the authors’ estimates based on
open sources.
5.	Tonnage and displacement are not an accurate measure of sea keeping. For example,
many PAFMM boats can operate across the
ocean, but most are below five hundred tons.
In contrast, some vessels of greater than a
thousand tons are not suited to offshore
operations. For ease of readability and
metrics, this article’s tables group vessels as
“oceangoing” or “offshore capable,” but in
reality there is no set measure for assigning a
ship to such categories. The phrase capable of
operating offshore and the numbers associated
with it are the product of analysis aimed at
determining which specific ships can operate
competently at significant distances from the
coast. Ships that cannot operate offshore are
not included, regardless of displacement.
6.	The CCG lacks underway replenishment
capabilities, so port access is essential when
additional supplies are needed.
7.	Ryan D. Martinson, “From Words to Actions:
The Creation of the China Coast Guard”
(paper presented at the “China as a ‘Maritime
Power’ Conference,” CNA conference facility,
Arlington, VA, July 28–29, 2015), p. 14, available at www.cna.org/.
8.	Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy:
New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st
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Enforcement Comparison”); Martinson,
“From Words to Actions”; Swee Lean Collin
Koh, “Beijing’s ‘White Hull’ Challenge in the
South China Sea,” National Interest, January
13, 2016, www.nationalinterest.org/.
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9.	Stephen Saunders, China listings in IHS Jane’s
Fighting Ships, 116th ed. and earlier.
10. Most U.S.-allied military organizations used
this term during the 1990s and early years of
the following decade to describe white hulls.
WAGOR = (W)AGOR, with W indicating a
nonnaval designation and AGOR signifying
an oceanographic research ship.
11. Masafumi Iida, “Maritime Expansion by
China,” Sasakawa USA, October 22, 2014,
spfusa.org/.
12. By contrast, SOA drew its officers primarily
from among retired PLAN officers and MSA
drew its officers from the merchant fleet, so
both services had an easier time adapting
to larger offshore vessels. Barney Moreland
[Capt., USCG (Ret.)], personal interview, December 3, 2018. Captain Moreland is a former
U.S. Coast Guard liaison officer to China.
13. Its launch was delayed by several years because the 2008 Wenzhou earthquake caused
the government to sweep unspent moneys to
effect recovery, which pushed back shipbuilding schedules. To cover the gap, FLE took
possession of an old PLAN submarine rescue
ship and recommissioned it as FLE 311,
until the purpose-built cutter 310 could be
constructed. Ibid.
14. The Fisheries Law Enforcement Command
also has had a very close working relationship
with the U.S. Coast Guard.
15. Xiao Ming, “China Maritime Safety Administration in the New Millennium: Challenges
and Strategies,” Paper 424 (dissertation,
World Maritime Univ., 2000), especially pp.
13, 21, available at commons.wmu.se/.
16. See, for example, Yang Chang, “Zhongguo
Haijian Tianjin Shi weiquan zhifa chuandui
guapai” [CMS Tianjin rights-protection
law-enforcement fleet is set up], China Ocean
News, April 19, 2013, p. 4; Martinson, “From
Words to Actions,” pp. 18, 44–45; Ryan Martinson, “Power to the Provinces: The Devolution of China’s Maritime Rights Protection,”
Jamestown Foundation China Brief 14, no. 17
(September 10, 2014), available at jamestown
.org/.
17. 孙鼎 [Sun Ding], 海监队员是怎样炼成
的 [“How CMS Personnel Are Trained”], 中
国海洋报 [China Ocean News], December
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Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 33

33

Actions,” pp. 14, 22; 海洋发展战略研究所
课题组 [China Institute for Marine Affairs
Special Topic Group], 中国海洋发展报告
(2013) [China’s Ocean Development Report
(2013)] (Beijing: Ocean, 2013), p. 267.
18. Very few of the “new,” more specialized ships
were constructed after the CCG consolidation of 2013. The consolidation happened
only five years ago, so most ships launched
by the time of publication were ordered, or at
least planned, before that happened. To date,
the postconsolidation CCG has not received
many new ships of its own.
19. Despite Internet speculation, however, the
Zhaogao is not based on the Jiangdao-class
corvette.
20. “China Coast Guard Gets New Patrol
Vessel Based on PLAN’s Type 056 Corvette,”
Navy Recognition, February 4, 2016, www
.navyrecognition.com/.
21. This refers to the same kind of joint patrols
and open-ocean fisheries surveillance that
FLE has been doing for years with smaller,
less-capable patrol ships.
22. Lyle Goldstein, “Chinese Fisheries Enforcement: Environmental and Strategic Implications,” Marine Policy 40 (2013), pp. 187–93,
available at digitalcommons.unl.edu/;
“Fisheries Law Enforcement Command,”
GlobalSecurity.org.
23. A ship’s tumblehome refers to the narrowing
of its upper hull as it rises above the waterline,
primarily to reduce radar and wake signatures.
24. “CMS—China Marine Surveillance,”
GlobalSecurity.org; “China Coast Guard,”
OPLAN: China (blog), n.d., www.oplanchina
.blogspot.com/.
25. The press releases that announced the Zhao
tou flagships’ launch specifically highlighted
that this class had hulls that were reinforced
for ramming and shouldering, but were
surprisingly mute regarding traditional coast
guard capabilities (e.g., how many boarding
teams they could deploy, or their rescue capabilities). They have substantial command and
control suites aboard, including conference
rooms and command centers, and can berth
VIPs. Apart from being a floating command
center, they have no capabilities that smaller,
faster, cheaper cutters do not share. Moreland
interview, December 3, 2018.
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26. China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation,
hundreds of press releases 2005–17, available
at www.csic.com.cn/.
27. Notably, as the Shucha II class became operational, in recent years the two Shucha Is were
transferred back to SOA’s scientific branch
and renamed with Xiang Yang Hong prefixes,
not the Zhong Guo Hai Jian and Hai Jing
prefixes on the newer ships.
28. Firsthand design analysis based on photography of the MSA Shuoshi I– and CCG Shuoshi
II–class ships.
29. Firsthand analysis of design, compared with
CRS heavy salvage ships.
30. “People’s Armed Police,” GlobalSecurity.org.
31. Photography from Super Base Camp Military
Forum, www.cjdby.com, and other web
forums, compared with the known configuration and design of the Jiangkai II frigate.
32. SinoDefence forum and blog articles, www
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etc.).
35. China Defense.com forum and blog, www
.china-defense.com/. This discussion forum
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36. Google Earth, www.google.com/earth. This
open-source imagery program is available
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includes thousands of official press releases
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38. According to MSA’s extensive and comprehensive daily press releases. Ibid.
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40. China Rescue and Salvage official website,
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bureaus also maintain their own websites.
Details of CRS missions, basing locations,
and order of battle from Song Jiahui [Capt.],
Director-General, CRS, “Maritime Rescue
and Salvage in China: A General Introduction
and Some Typical Cases” (PowerPoint presentation, November 2009), available at www
.transportation.gov/.
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division of focus, the pushback on China’s
maritime expansionism from immediate
neighbors as well as the United States and
other Western countries is keeping much
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42. Ryan D. Martinson, “The Arming of China’s
Maritime Frontier,” China Maritime Report 2,
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